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The First Major "Water Transfer": 
Opening the Floodgates 
by Jon D. Ferguson* 
On December 13, 1988, two southern 
California water districts entered into a 
landmark "agreement in principle". The 
Metropolitan Water District (MWD), 
which supplies water to fourteen million 
Californians in six counties, agreed to 
finance $92 million worth of conserva-
tion projects in the Imperial Irrigation 
District (IID), which is based in Im-
perial, California and which annually 
diverts some 2.6 million acre-feet of 
Colorado River water to irrigate the 
Imperial Valley. In exchange, MWD will 
receive 100,000 acre-feet of water per 
year from IID-the approximate amount 
of water IID will conserve each year 
through the MWD-financed projects. 1 
Why is this agreement so unusual? 
Historically ( and very simplistically), 
water rights have been allocated on a 
"use-it-or-lose-it" basis-such that IID 
(which has a vested right to 2.6 million 
acre-feet of Colorado River water an-
nually,2 and which seeks to preserve its 
right to every ounce of that water should 
drought strike the arid region it serves) 
would be unwilling to negotiate the deal, 
for fear its "transfer" of water would be 
an admission that it does not need or-
in water law parlance-"beneficially use" 
its entire allocation. And MWD, which 
would be entitled to the Colorado River 
water rights forfeited by 11D if it were 
found that IID does not beneficially use 
its entire allocation, would clearly rather 
"inherit" that water than pay for it. The 
December 1988 agreement-reached after 
five years of sometimes hostile negotia-
tions-represents a compromise between 
these two stances long maintained by 
the competing water districts. 3 
The benefits of this so-called "water 
transfer" are clear: 11D will be en-
couraged to conserve as much water as 
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possible for this and any other potential 
"transfer" without losing its vested allo-
cation of Colorado River water; and 
MWD is able to provide its constituents 
with additional water without protracted 
legal proceedings and at a price which is 
cheaper than other alternatives. 
"Water marketing"-the ability to buy 
and sell water rights on an open market 
as though water were any other com-
modity exchanged in private markets4-
would result in a more efficient and 
rational allocation of this precious 
resource than exists under the current 
"beneficial use" fiction. Open market 
water transfers would encourage conser-
vation, develop revenue to finance fur-
ther conservation measures, and protect 
against drought-to name but a few of 
the advantages to be gained. The public 
interest demands that other water agen-
cies follow the lead of MWD and !ID. 
So why was this agreement so long 
in coming? Is it legal? And where will it 
lead? 
This article surveys the complex 
world of traditional California and 
federal water law and policy, which have 
long been viewed as major impediments 
to the implementation of open market 
water transfers. However, recent legis-
lation and rulemaking on both the state 
and federal levels have finally disarmed 
the fear that a water "transfer"-which 
is a euphemism persistently used in the 
water marketing industry for the word 
"sale"-will lead to the forfeiture of 
water rights. In addition, recent decisions 
by the state Water Resources Control 
Board (WRCB)-the California agency 
charged with the efficient administra-
tion of the state's water resources-
mandate the type of conservation 
measures which will now be financed 
byMWD. 
State Water Law 
California water rights law recognizes 
a "dual system" of water rights, ack-
nowledging both the "riparian" and 
"appropriation" doctrines.s 
Riparian Water Rights. A riparian 
right refers to that right conferred upon 
an owner of land, bounded or traversed 
by a natural stream, to the use of that 
stream or water. The riparian doctrine 
requires that the owner of such land put 
the water only to such use on his land as 
is reasonable and beneficial.6 
No priority in time exists as among 
riparian rights holders; 7 however, 
domestic users (e.g., household and 
domestic animals) may have preference 
over "artificial" purposes such as irriga-
tion, commercial livestock watering, and 
industrial use.8 When demand exceeds 
the available supply of a water source, 
the available water is shared pro rata 
among the riparians. 9 
In 1886, riparian rights become firmly 
established in California in Lux v. 
Haggin. 10 Under Lux, riparian rights 
are neither increased by use, nor lost by 
non use. 11 In 1928, the California Consti-
tution was amended to require that the 
state's water resources be put to bene-
ficial use to the fullest extent possible. 12 
Riparian rights are subject to this pro-
vision.13 Thus, where an unexercised 
riparian right restricts beneficial use, 
that right is adverse to the Constitution. 
In 1979, the California Supreme Court 
recognized this conflict in In re Waters 
of Long Valley Creek Stream System. 14 
The court held that the WRCB, when 
determining all claimed rights to water 
in a stream system, has the authority to 
decide that an unexercised riparian claim 
loses its priority relative to all rights 
currently being exercised. 15 In times of 
shortage, possession of the right lowest 
in priority is tantamount to having no 
right. Thus, an unexercised riparian 
right may be at risk.16 
Appropriative Water Rights. Appro-
priative water rights are not dependent 
upon contiguity of land to the water 
supply, but are based on the taking of 
possession of water for a beneficial use. 
Appropriative rights have as their origin 
the days of the California Gold Rush, 
when miners diverted water required for 
their placer mining claims. 17 These 
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miners were responsible for adopting 
the priority rule of "first in time, first in 
right," a concept which has characterized 
the appropriative doctrine to the present 
day. 18 The first statute regulating diver-
sion was enacted in 1872 with the 
adoption of the Civil Code. 19 The statu-
tory method for perfecting an appropria-
tive right required the posting of a 
notice of intent to appropriate and the 
recording of that notice. 20 The 1913 
passage of the Water Commission Act 
superseded the previous methods and 
set forth a procedure for appropriating 
water for useful and beneficial pur-
poses. 21 An application, permit, and 
license are now required in order to 
obtain and perfect an appropriative 
water right. 22 
Apart from these procedural steps, 
the validity of a water appropriation 
requires three elements: (I) an intent to 
put such water to an existing or con-
templated beneficial use; (2) an actual 
diversion from the watercourse's natural 
channel by some sufficient method; and 
(3) application of the diverted water to a 
beneficial use within a reasonable time.23 
Water is viewed as a public resource 
and, as such, may be privately appro-
priated only to the extent that such use 
is both reasonable and beneficial.24 Even 
uses which are beneficial must consume 
appropriated water in a reasonable 
amount and method.25 
Priority among appropriative rights 
holders, as noted above, is allocated 
according to the "first in time, first in 
right" principle.26 Junior appropriators 
are entitled only to such use as does not 
deprive senior appropriators of their 
allocation. 27 A senior appropriator may 
take all of her allocation before the 
junior appropriator may take anything.28 
The rights of even a senior appropriator, 
however, are subordinate to those of a 
riparian. 29 
Recent California Legislation. Appro-
priative water rights have traditionally 
been accompanied by the forfeiture doc-
trine.30 In other words, if an appro-
priator is not beneficially using his 
entire entitlement, he is in jeopardy of 
losing his right to the extent of the 
nonuse. 31 Such a notion has had the 
effect of deterring transfers as well as 
conservation efforts.32 Water Code sec-
tion 1241 provides for the reversion to 
the public of unused appropriated water. 
In 1980, the statute was amended to 
require reversion only if the WRCB 
makes a finding of non-beneficial use 
for a period of five years, following 
notice to the permittee and a public 
hearing if requested by the permittee. 
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Prior to this amendment, such rights 
could be lost after only three years of 
non-beneficial use, and the permittee 
was not clearly entitled to a public hear-
ing prior to the reversion. Rather than 
encouraging conservation or transfers, 
the harshness and uncertainty of the 
previous version of the statute encour-
aged hasty use of the appropriated 
amounts so as not to result in non-use.33 
The 1980 amendment of section 1241 
was consistent with a trend in California 
legislation beginning in 1978 which clear-
ly encourages the transfer of appro-
priated water rights in order to maximize 
the water's utility. In 1978, Water Code 
section 1010 was amended to remove 
disincentives to the use of reclaimed 
water. Amended subsection (b) provides: 
"Water, or the right to the use of water, 
the use of which has ceased or been 
reduced as the result of the use of re-
claimed or polluted water. .. may be sold, 
leased, exchanged, or otherwise transfer-
red pursuant to any provision of law 
relating to the transfer of water or water 
rights .... " Under this amendment, a re-
duction in the use of appropriated water 
by virtue of substitution of reclaimed 
water will not cause reversion to the 
public; instead, the right to that saved 
appropriated water may be sold, ex-
changed or otherwise transferred. 
In 1979, Water Code section 1011 
was added, which explicitly declares 
conservation to be within the meaning 
of "beneficial use." For example, 
"[ w ]here water appropriated for irriga-
tion purposes is not used by reason of 
land fallowing or crop rotation, the 
reduced usage shall be deemed water 
conservation .... " As amended in I 982, 
section 10 I I provides that water so con-
served may be sold, leased, exchanged, 
or otherwise transferred without a loss 
of any amount of the appropriation. In 
1980, Water Code section 109 was added, 
declaring the policy of the state in pro-
moting the efficient use of water: " .. .It is 
hereby declared to be the established 
policy of this state to facilitate the vol-
untary transfer of water and water rights 
where consistent with the public welfare 
of the place of export and the place of 
import." Section 109 was amended in 
1982 to direct the Department of Water 
Resources, the WRCB, and all other 
appropriate state agencies to encourage 
voluntary transfers by, among other 
things, providing technical assistance in 
order to identify and implement water 
conservation measures which will make 
additional water available for transfer. 
Also in 1980, the California legisla-
ture added section 1244 to the Water 
Code, as further evidence of a policy 
aimed at promoting water transfers. 
Section 1244 provides: 
The sale, lease, exchange, or 
transfer of water or water rights, 
in itself, shall not constitute evi-
dence of waste or unreasonable 
use, unreasonable method of use, 
or unreasonable method of diver-
sion and shall not affect any deter-
mination of forfeiture applicable 
to water appropriated pursuant to 
the Water Commission Act or this 
code or water appropriated prior 
to December 19, 1914. 
This section does not constitute 
a change in, but is declaratory of, 
existing law. 
The most recent legislative mandate 
was the 1986 passage of the Costa-Isen-
berg Water Transfer Act.34 Section 475 
of the Water Code sets forth the legisla-
ture's findings: 
The Legislature hereby finds 
and declares that voluntary water 
transfers between water users can 
result in a more efficient use of 
water, benefiting both the buyer 
and the seller. 
The Legislature further finds 
and declares that transfers of sur-
plus water on an intermittent basis 
can help alleviate water shortages, 
save capital outlay development 
costs, and conserve water and 
energy. 
The Legislature further finds 
and declares that it is in the public 
interest to conserve all available 
water resources, and that this inter-
est requires the coordinated assist-
ance of state agencies for voluntary 
water transfers to allow more in-
tensive use of developed water 
resources in a manner that fully 
protects the interests of other en-
tities which have rights to, or rely 
on, the water covered by a pro-
posed transfer. 
Also in 1986, the legislature passed a 
so-called "wheeling" statute, which for-
bids the state or any regional or local 
public agency from denying a water 
transferor the use of a water conveyance 
facility which has unused capacity, so 
long as fair compensation is paid for 
that use by the transferor.35 In light of 
the above-described enactments, there is 
no question that riparian or appropria-
tive water rights to California water 
may be transferred. However, not all 
water used in California is of completely 
intrastate origin. At the heart of Cali-
fornia's water marketing and water rights 
controversy lies the Colorado River. 
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Because the River is an interstate water-
course, its waters are initially subject to 
a different body of laws. 
"The Law of the River" 
The Colorado River originates in the 
Colorado Rocky Mountains and travels 
southwest for 1,300 miles before empty-
ing into Mexico's Gulf of California. On 
the way, it passes through Colorado, 
Utah, and Arizona; it marks the bound-
ary between Arizona and Nevada, and 
between California and Arizona.36 The 
Colorado River Basin drains 242,000 
square miles-an area roughly compris-
ing one-twelfth the area of the United 
States, excluding Alaska. The lack of 
precipitation in this region of the coun-
try and its dependence upon the River 
as its primary source of water demands 
managed use of "the unruly river. "37 
During the latter part of the nine-
teenth century, groups from the Imperial 
Valley began to investigate ways to 
divert water from the mainstream of the 
Colorado River. 38 In 1901, irrigation in 
the Valley using River water began 
through privately-financed efforts.39 
When the necessity of taming the 
"erratic and often destructive flow of 
the Colorado River into a controlled 
and dependable water supply"40 became 
evident, federal legislative studies into 
the issue commenced. One such study 
concluded that "the job was so big that 
only the Federal Government could do 
it," and recommended that the United 
States construct an All-American canal 
from the Colorado River to the Imperial 
Valley, as well as a dam and reservoir at 
or near Boulder Canyon. 41 
This proposal was welcomed by the 
seven Colorado River Basin states,42 but 
it also triggered apprehension that the 
faster-growing Lower Basin states (e.g., 
California) might drain the River's re-
sources through "rapid declaration of 
appropriative claims"43 before the Upper 
Basin states, which had stable popula-
tion sizes, could appropriate their reason-
able share. 44 Since the "first in time, 
first in right" doctrine of prior appro-
priation dominated western water law, 
the Upper Basin states' fears were not 
without foundation. Matters were made 
worse in 1922 when the U.S. Supreme 
Court held that the doctrine of prior 
appropriation could be given interstate 
effect.45 
This uneasiness among the Basin 
states prompted them to request Con-
gressional permission to negotiate among 
themselves, along with a United States 
representative, a compact for the equit-
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able apportionment of the waters of the 
Colorado River.46 Congress consented 
and the negotiations resulted in a 1922 
agreement known as the Colorado River 
Compact (Compact). 47 An equitable ap-
portionment of each of the seven Basin 
states' shares of the water was not 
successfully negotiated; however, the 
Compact did provide for division of the 
River between the Upper and Lower 
Basins at a point in the River known as 
Lee Ferry in northern Arizona.48 The 
Compact apportioned 7.5 million acre-
feet of water annually to each of the two 
Basins.49 
The Compact-authorizing legislation, 
and the Compact itself, required ratifi-
cation by all seven Basin states before it 
could become effective. Arizona alone 
refused to ratify the Compact, due in 
part to its dispute with California over 
the applicability of the Compact to 
Lower Basin tributaries of the River, 
and also due to the agreement's failure 
to determine each state's share of the 
water.50 
The impasse was finally resolved with 
the December 2 I, 1928 passage of the 
Boulder Canyon Project Act (Project 
Act). 51 The Project Act allowed the 
Compact to become operative upon 
ratification by six of the seven states 
(including California), provided that 
California agree to limit its water right 
to 4.4 million acre-feet per year. 52 The 
Project Act also provided for construc-
tion by the United States of a diversion 
dam and a new canal to connect the IID 
to the dam-subject to the IID's agree-
ment to pay for these works. 53 On June 
25, 1929, when the Project Act became 
effective, the IID was already annually 
diverting and delivering 2.6 million 
acre-feet of water to 424,145 privately-
owned acres in the Imperial Valley.54 
Both the Compact and the Project 
Act addressed the "present perfected 
rights" of then-existing Colorado River 
appropriators (including IID), 55 and 
neither purport to divest any appropria-
tor of water rights which had vested 
under applicable state law prior to the 
effective date of the statute. Although 
the Project Act authorized the Secretary 
of the U.S. Department of the Interior 
to contract for storage and delivery of 
River water,56 and restricted the use of 
River water except under such a con-
tract, it also "required that the Secretary 
of the Interior ... observe rights to Color-
ado River water that had been perfected 
under state law at the time the [Project] 
Act became effective. ''57 
Thus, so long as the Project Act is 
effective, the federal government may 
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not reduce IID's 2.6-million-acre-feet-
per-year allocation of Colorado River 
water.58 Under the Act and cases inter-
preting it, the Interior Secretary's 
interest is in recouping the federal gov-
ernment's "expenses of construction, 
operation, and maintenance of the dam 
and other works within 50 years after 
their construction, "59 rather than in re-
stricting his/ her contractees' use of 
Colorado River water subsequent to 
delivery of that water. The impending 
MWD/IID water transfer does not ap-
pear to be precluded by the Project Act, 
the cases under it, or by any action of 
the Interior Department contemplated 
by the drafters of the Act. 
In fact, the Interior Department, as 
recently as December 16, 1988, issued a 
written policy supporting water transfers 
of the kind proposed by MWD and 
IID. 60 In its policy statement, the De-
partment recognized that "[t]ransactions 
that involve water rights and supplies 
are occurring pursuant to State law with 
increasing frequency in the Nation, par-
ticularly in the Western United States," 
and set forth seven "Voluntary Water 
Transaction Principles." According to 
the principles, the Department's function 
will be to "facilitate transactions that 
are in accordance with applicable State 
and Federal law and proposed by 
others. " 61 Naturally, an additional 
objective of the Department is to ensure 
a continued satisfactory "financial, oper-
ational, and contractual position" for 
the federal government following such a 
transaction. 62 
Thus, the proposed transfer could 
only affect IID's allocation of Colorado 
River water if the state water authority-
the Water Resources Control Board-
finds that it is somehow a non-beneficial 
use which violates the California Consti-
tution.63 This result is not likely, if the 
Board is called upon to review the legali-
ty of the transfer and remains consistent 
with its earlier decisionmaking. 
The WRCB and Decision 1600 
The WRCB was established in 1967 
by the Porter-Cologne Water Quality 
Control Act.64 The Board is vested with 
authority over both water rights and 
water quality issues. With respect to 
water rights, the WRCB has powers to 
investigate streams, lakes, and other 
water bodies, to take testimony regard-
ing water rights or usage, and to ascer-
tain if water filed upon or attempted to 
be appropriated is legally appropriated. 65 
The Board also issues permits for the 
appropriation of water for beneficial 
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purposes under such terms as it decides 
will best develop, conserve, and utilize, 
in the public interest, the water sought.66 
It is vested with broad discretion in such 
determinations. 67 
In 1984, the WRCB issued its land-
mark Decision 1600, which arose from 
allegations that the IID was unreason-
ably wasting a portion of its Colorado 
River allocation.68 Following an extens-
ive evidentiary hearing, the Board held 
that IID's failure to implement specified 
conservation measures and irrigation 
practices was resulting in the loss of one 
million acre-feet per year 69-almost half 
of IID's allocation. Although the Board 
recognized that IID had taken some 
steps to conserve water, it found that 
"there are additional practical measures 
available to reduce the present losses of 
water within the District. Under the cir-
cumstances of this case, the Board con-
cludes that the failure to implement 
additional water conservation measures 
at this time is unreasonable and consti-
tutes a misuse of water under Article X, 
Section 2 of the California Constitution 
and Section 100 of the California Water 
Code.''70 
In discussing the allegations and its 
findings, the Board essentially found 
that IID has a duty to conserve and a 
duty to transfer that conserved water. 
Far from frowning upon transfers, the 
Board discussed a potential transfer of 
conserved water ("[i]n appropriate con-
ditions, the conserved water presumably 
could be transferred directly to another 
party by agreement between IID and 
the other party"),7 1 predicted that the 
U.S. Bureau of Reclamation would "sup-
port a workable water transfer arrange-
ment, ''72 noted that a transfer arrange-
ment was then in effect between MWD 
and the Coachella Valley Water District 
(which was a small-scale version of the 
proposed MWD-IID transaction),73 and 
cited Water Code section 1011 for its 
position that, "[ u ]nder appropriate cir-
cumstances, the maximum beneficial use 
provision of Article X, Section 2 of the 
California Constitution may mandate 
the transfer of surplus water to water-
short areas. ''74 
Following the Board's issuance of 
Decision 1600, IID instituted numerous 
water conservation projects75 and devel-
oped its 1985 Water Conservation Plan.76 
The Plan outlined nineteen specific 
long-term water conservation goals 
which would result in the conservation 
of 367,900 acre-feet per annum. 77 
Because of a lack of funding and un-
successful negotiations with MWD for a 
transfer arrangement, no plan for imple-
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menting the projects proposed in the 
1985 Plan was established until recent 
1988 proceedings before the WRCB. 78 
During the summer of 1988, IID 
presented to the WRCB its "strategy for 
implementing those elements of its 1985 
conservation plan which the District 
considers could be efficiently executed 
in a cost-effective manner. ''79 In a Sep-
tember 7, 1988 order, the WRCB adopted 
the plan and ordered IID to present to 
it by January I, 1989 a "written plan 
and definite implementation schedule for 
the additional water conservation 
measures which !ID selects. The plan 
should specify water conservation 
measures estimated to conserve at least 
100,000 acre-feet per annum by January 
I, 1994."80 
Also in its September 7 order, the 
Board directed IID to "specify the chosen 
method of financing ... accompanied by 
proof of diligent efforts to secure such 
financing .... Said proof of efforts to 
secure funding shall consist of a resolu-
tion by the Imperial Irrigation District 
Board of Directors committing the Dis-
trict to fund implementation of the 
selected water conservation measures 
using District resources, or an executed 
agreement with a separate entity willing 
to finance water conservation measures 
in Imperial Irrigation District, or evi-
dence of a comparable action which 
assures adequate funding for the selected 
water conservation measures. ''8 1 
In reaching its conclusion, the Board 
once again noted the state policy of 
encouraging water transfers and its 
authority to adjudicate the constitu-
tional issue of IID's unreasonable use of 
water,82 with an eye toward divesting 
IID of a portion of its Colorado River 
water allocation should IID fail to satisfy 
the order. The WRCB painstakingly re-
counted the course of the IID / MWD 
negotiations-including the offers and 
counteroffers83-and noted that "[t]he 
availability of financial resources for 
implementing proposed water conserva-
tion measures is a factor to be consid-
ered in evaluating the reasonableness of 
an existing method of diversion and 
use .... If sufficient funding is available to 
implement reasonable water conservation 
measures, then the failure to implement 
such measures could endanger the under-
lying right. ''84 
The Marketplace Approach to 
Water Resource Allocation: 
Advantages in the Public Interest 
The IID should not have to be 
dragged to the bargaining table. As 
demonstrated above, neither federal nor 
state law precludes California water 
transfers. To the contrary, state statutes 
and regulatory policy encourage such 
transfers. The interest of the public like-
wise calls for the free transferability of 
the state's water resources, and the 
marketplace is the forum in which those 
transfers should be accomplished. 
Incentive to Conserve. An obvious 
yet fundamental policy consideration 
supporting water transfers is the eco-
nomic incentive to maximize the efficient 
use of water. Suppose Farmer A has the 
right to more water than is required to 
meet his current irrigation needs. In the 
absence of an ability to transfer those 
rights to willing buyers, he will be com-
pelled to use the excess water in any 
way possible to avoid the risk of losing 
any of his appropriation. For instance, 
he may use the excess water to produce 
a relatively unprofitable crop which 
would serve primarily to use up his water 
allotment. If, on the other hand, Farmer 
A can sell the rights to his excess water 
without losing any of his appropriation, 
he will naturally do so since the water is 
more valuable as a commodity than it is 
for wasteful irrigation use. In turn, the 
buyer (who is willing to pay for the 
rights) will presumably put the water to 
a use which will maximize its utility. 
Farmer A will be encouraged to conserve 
as much water as possible for transfer 
purposes, and the water will be used in 
a maximally efficient manner. 
Putting this hypothetical construct 
into the reality of California's Central 
and Imperial Valleys clarifies its import. 
Farmers in the Imperial Valley pay $10 
per acre-foot for water. To others, that 
water is worth $120 to $300 per acre-
foot. But, in the absence of water mar-
keting, those others cannot buy it and 
the farmers dare not sell it for fear of 
losing their allocation. Indeed, as the 
market price rises over the price paid by 
farmers, their desire to maintain their 
allocation increases. In order to main-
tain that allocation, they flood fields to 
grow low-value crops (including alfalfa 
and animal feeds) in the desert environs 
of California's inland valleys. A rational 
buyer is blocked and a rational seller is 
stifled. The result: waste and uneco-
nomic use. 
Protection of Society Against Fluctu-
ating Water Supplies. The transfer of 
water rights would facilitate the imple-
mentation of such open market concepts 
as drought insurance, by allowing rights 
holders to sell the rights to their appro-
priation in the event of a drought. The 
drought insurance concept allows lower-
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priority appropriators to protect them-
selves against the risk of drought by 
paying a yearly "premium" to senior 
appropriators. 85 If drought were to 
occur, the senior appropriators (i.e., the 
insurers) would deliver to the junior 
appropriators (i.e., the insureds) an amount 
of water consistent with the fee paid. 
The City of San Diego's situation 
has often been used to illustrate the 
operation of drought insurance.B6 San 
Diego is supplied water by MWD and is 
its lowest-priority user. It would thus be 
hardest-hit in the event of a southern 
California drought. If IID successfully 
implements its nineteen-point plan and 
conserves 367,900 acre-feet per year, it 
would have more than enough water to 
satisfy its obligation to MWD under the 
proposed water transfer and enter into 
other transfer or "drought insurance" 
arrangements. 
The two parties are prime candidates 
to enter into a drought insurance agree-
ment. San Diego could pay a yearly fee 
to the IID for the future right to use the 
IID's irrigation water in the event of a 
drought. This fee would operate as an 
insurance premium, or as a sort of re-
tainer fee for keeping II D's water "on call." 
Were a drought to occur, San Diego 
could exercise its option to divert IID's 
water for its municipal needs. On top of 
the annual premium, San Diego could 
also be required to pay IID for the water 
actually diverted during the drought.87 
IID could use the funds to compen-
sate farmers for crops foregone due to 
the loss of irrigation water. Additionally, 
the yearly premiums could be invested 
within IID in years where no diversion 
is necessary. San Diego, on the other 
hand, would be secure in the knowledge 
that, in case of a drought, its water 
needs would be met. Additionally, San 
Diego could avoid the expense of build-
ing extra storage facilities to ensure 
against a water shortage caused by 
drought.BB 
Revenue for Further Development 
and Compensation. In the case of public 
water agencies which sell water rights, 
revenue would be generated which could 
be used to fund the development of 
additional water resources. In other 
words, the water marketing scheme is a 
system which could sustain itself. 
The proceeds from water transfers 
could be put toward researching and 
developing additional water conservation 
measures-such as the ones IID believes 
will yield 367,900 acre-feet per year, but 
which it cannot afford alone. Transferors 
would also receive compensation for 
decreased revenue from the generation 
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of hydroelectric power.B9 
Finally, money generated from water 
transfers could compensate for wildlife 
loss. For instance, if transfers of water 
out of the IID were to result in an 
increase in the salinity level of the 
Salton Sea, fish and other wildlife may 
perish. The revenues generated from the 
transfer could aid in alleviating this side 
effect. 
Preservation of Environment. Open 
market water transfers would likely re-
duce the need for additional construction 
of environmentally damaging large-scale 
dam-and-canal projects.90 If water rights 
were freely transferable, those in need of 
additional water would be more inclined 
to buy that water from an existing rights 
holder at a presumably lower price, 
rather than pay reimbursement costs to 
a governmental agency for construction 
costs in building a new dam or canal.91 
Conclusion 
The open market possesses the ability 
to coordinate supply and demand: as 
supply of a commodity fluctuates, the 
price per unit will vary accordingly as 
the gain-maximizing consumer adjusts 
her demand for that commodity. Thus, 
the system reaches a state of equilibrium. 
The gasoline "shortage" of the late 1970s 
has been used to illustrate this phenom-
enon.92 As gasoline prices soared and 
lines at the gas pumps increased during 
this period, consumers responded by re-
ducing gasoline consumption. Simul-
taneously, oil and gas producers saw the 
potential for profits and responded with 
increased supplies. Thus, the market 
reached a state of equilibrium and the 
crisis was resolved through resort to the 
market system.93 
There is no reason to suggest that 
this same market responsiveness would 
not occur to effectively regulate the dis-
tribution of water resources for maxi-
mum efficiency. In light of the legal and 
practical considerations discussed above, 
and recognizing southern California's 
continuing population growth and the 
corresponding demands that such growth 
places on its existing water supply, the 
WRCB should go far beyond its order 
of September 7, 1988.94 Its authority to 
adjudicate the issue of water waste has 
been upheld after five years of litiga-
tion95-and it has now given IID another 
five years to implement measures which 
will conserve only 100,000 acre-feet of 
water per year. Three years ago, IID 
identified nineteen measures which would 
enable it to conserve almost four times 
that amount-and WRCB should waste 
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no time in adopting that nineteen-point 
plan and ordering IID to finance it 
through water transfers. Such an order 
would be consistent with state policy 
and encourage other water rights holders 
to conserve and transfer-resulting in 
the most efficient use of this precious 
resource. 
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